Abstract
Introduction
Field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) offer a high degree of flexibility for multiple applications in space vehicle computers. [1] . The challenges faced by the developer of an FPGA-based system in space are not trivial. In addition to the damage of long-term radiation exposure, which can be minimized using standard electronics shielding techniques [2] , FPGAs are susceptible to errors in both data and architecture configuration caused by single event effects (SEE).
Triple modular redundancy (TMR) is a faulttolerance approach that uses parallel computation and voting to detect and correct errors in a circuit. The basic structure of TMR is to build three identical copies of an operation, and then apply a two-of-three majority voter to each bit of the output of the three circuits. The bitwise majority voter will correct any single error in the three operation circuits.
The concept of Reduced Precision Redundancy (RPR) allows the sacrifice of some level of precision in calculation, in the event that a fault occurs, in return for space and power savings on an FPGA. The theory as developed by Snodgrass [3] at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in 2006 suggests that instead of generating three identical copies of a circuit and voting on the outcome, some functions lend themselves to operating in a single thread at full precision, and in two additional threads at reduced precision. The two reduced-precision operations will generate an upper and lower bound on the correct function output. The precise calculation result is then compared to these upper and lower bounds, and voting logic determines whether the precise result may be used, or if an error has occurred in the precise solution and the average of the bounds must be used as a lessprecise result. Shanbhag and his colleagues have used the same title and similar concepts to flag errors in DSP applications [4] . The significant difference is that Shanbhag assumes that the redundant calculation and all voting/comparison logic are fault-free. Snodgrass and the results in this paper do not require this assumption.
In this paper we examine the performance of RPR for fundamental arithmetic operations.
Assumptions, Terminology and Rules
In order to discuss RPR, it is necessary to define a metric that represents the "degree" of RPR -that is, the amount by which precision is reduced for the redundant lower-precision calculations. We choose the ratio of the number of non-sign-bits r in the variables of the redundant calculations to the number of non-sign-bits n in the variables of the precise calculation. For example, if the precise operands are represented in eight bits of precision and the upper and lower bounds have five bits of precision, then the degree of RPR is r/n = 5/8.
To apply RPR successfully to a given operation, it is necessary to determine the reduced-precision upper and lower limits, or bounds, of the result (the output) as functions of the operands (the input). Using two's complement notation for addition and subtraction enables identical treatment of the two operations, provided the transitions between the negative number closest to zero (1.111… 2 ) and zero (0.000… 2 ) are carried out successfully. In this scheme, the upper bound of any operand or result x must lie to the right of x on a number line and the lower bound must lie to the left of x.
Comparing RPR & TMR Realizations
If RPR is to be useful, it must require less space than TMR on an FPGA while still providing the same accuracy of computation in a no-error situation, and accuracy within a certain tolerance when errors do occur. If this reduction in the area required can be achieved, using RPR instead of TMR to protect a circuit will require less power -or, conversely, more functionality may be obtained on a given FPGA. To demonstrate, RPR and TMR adders were programmed using Xilinx Integrated Simulation Environment (ISE) Release 6.3.03i and targeted for the Xilinx Virtex™ XQVR600. The RPR circuits contain both arithmetic operations and voters, and are compared to analogous TMR circuits using FPGA area as a metric for evaluation. The FPGA area is reported during the mapping process in ISE as a slice count [5] . The results are presented in Table 1 ., which illustrates that for simple operations, the added complexity of the voter overwhelms the reduction in the size of the operation module. Since multiplication is essentially a collection of many addition operations, it is reasonable that mapping a multiplication operation to an FPGA should require significantly greater area than an addition operation requires. This is indeed the case; in fact, the difference is so great that the size of the multiplication operation modules in either TMR or RPR implementations dwarfs the size of their respective voter modules, as shown in Table 2 . 
Modeling Errors Due to Single Event Effects

Classes of Errors in FPGAs
It is important to remember that there are two distinct classes of SEE generated faults that may cause errors in an FPGA-based system. A data fault occurs when a charged particle changes the value or one or more bits in data memory. This may cause a transient error, so named because it only lasts as long as that particular piece of data is in the system. A configuration fault occurs when a charged particle changes the value of one or more bits in the memory that stores the configuration of the FPGA. In the Xilinx® Virtex™ XQVR600 FPGAs used in this study, there are 6,127,744 configuration bits and only 98,304 total block SelectRAM bits [5] , so it is much more likely that a randomly incident charged particle will affect a configuration bit than a data bit. A configuration memory fault also has the potential to inflict much more damage on a reconfigurable system than a transient fault could cause, because a configuration fault has the potential to generate an error in every value that it touches -it is persistent. Both classes of faults manifest themselves as errors in the output values of a reconfigurable computer. However, the propagation and extent of the errors 284 caused by data and configuration faults are different. A transient error due to a data fault may propagate through multiple steps in a processor, but within a finite number of clock cycles the error will become obsolete and no longer affect the computation results. A persistent error due to a configuration fault will not be corrected until part or all of the FPGA is reconfigured.
Modeling Errors as Noise
Consider a signal that is digitally sampled at regular intervals with precision 32 n = and maximum value of 1 volt. The smallest representable voltage level in the sampling regime, assuming fixed-point fractional representation, is 32 10 2 2.328 10
volts. If the signal processor has no fault tolerance and an error occurs, a given output could be incorrect in any or all digits: the maximum error magnitude is bounded by ( ) ( ) ( ) volts. If a signal processor has RPR fault tolerance and an error occurs, the RPR result will be used. The RPR result is guaranteed to be correct to the rth bit, i.e., maximum error is volts. The r-bit RPR result sacrifices r -n bits of precision while it preserves r bits of precision in the fault case. The difference in magnitude of the error in a system with no fault tolerance and a system with RPR fault tolerance can be expressed using the signal-tonoise ratio (SNR). When there is no fault tolerance in a system, the "noise" that corrupts a result due to an error has the same potential magnitude and power as the signal itself.
The maximum possible error for worst-case error scenarios. When an error is detected in an RPR system and the RPR result is used, the loss of precision in the RPR result is analogous to noise at a lower power. In the example system (8/32 RPR), the relative noise power represented by the RPR result is . This procedure can be applied to any degree of RPR to determine the equivalent noise introduced by using the RPR result.
Experiment Details
The experiments described below were conducted using MATLAB Release 2007a with Simulink version 6.6. Machine epsilon ε for the system configuration , equivalent to n = 52 in fixedpoint representation. Errors were simulated using either a random number generator with output scaling (to represent an uncorrected error or an RPR result), or an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel simulator with SNR corresponding to the desired reduction in precision. The example system chosen for RPR performance evaluation was the NPS Bifocal Relay Mirror Satellite (BRMS) Simulator (BRMSS) attitude control system model, developed in 2005 by Kim [7] .
One of the most sensitive points in a satellite ADCS is allocation of the control command to the actuators -in this case, Control Moment Gyros (CMGs). CMGs are heavy, delicate machinery that apply very high torque to a spacecraft relative to the power they require to operate.
An error in commanding a set of CMGs can cause both temporary and permanent damage to the CMG's and the spacecraft. For this reason, the worst-case scenario was chosen by injecting error into the control command.
The three components of the control command were passed through independent additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels.
Since the experiment was meant to simulate a single event effect, only one noise channel was activated for any given trial.
The scenario used for the experiment was a standard "reference maneuver," where the spacecraft began at rest in attitude orientation ( ) ( )
and was commanded to move to orientation ( )
and stop. The maneuver with no fault-induced errors is executed in less than twenty seconds, which includes the time required for the system to settle to within two percent of the target orientation. Figure 1 .a. shows the reference maneuver with no error. The error scenarios tested with the ADCS model included both transient (discrete delta function δ) and persistent (step function) error models. Both types of errors occurred at five seconds into the simulation (t = 5). For each type of error, the reference maneuver was executed with SNR levels equivalent to no fault tolerance (SNR = 3 dB), and RPR fault tolerance for r = 8, 16, 24, and 32 (SNR = 27, 51, 75, and 99 dB, respectively). Rather than present an exhaustive collection of data from the thirty scenarios tested, the most significant result is included here. The first notable outcome of the tests is the conclusion that at the low operating power level assumed for this ADCS (25 mW), a transient data fault can generate an error only great enough to change the magnitude of the system transient response -it cannot change the steady-state properties of the system. The insertion of a transient error causes an overshoot in the response of the spacecraft, but the position settles to its steady state at ( ) Figure 1 . ADCS Reference Maneuver.
When a persistent error is introduced to a control system, the effect is much more significant. Since the source of a persistent error is in the system configuration, a persistent error corrupts data in every execution of the feedback loop and disturbs every control command sent to the actuators. A representative example of the effect of a persistent error in the control command is shown in Fig. 1 .b.
When RPR is applied to the system, the magnitude of the error is dramatically reduced.
While a configuration fault in the unprotected system causes unbounded error that makes the system completely unusable, a configuration fault in the system protected with RPR generates errors whose magnitude is strictly bounded, and even a small degree of RPR (r = 8) shows marked improvement in the system trajectory ( Fig. 1.c) .
The scenario in Fig. 1 .c was run with SNR equivalent to RPR of degree 8/52 (SNR = 27 dB) applied to the Y component of the control command. The response for RPR 8/52 is still not satisfactory for the fine pointing requirements of the BRMS, but would provide an adequately steady state to operate a spacecraft with less stringent attitude control mission requirements (e.g., an RF communications satellite). However, when the scenario was run with SNR equivalent to RPR of degree 16/52 (SNR = 51 dB), both control and angle trajectories were virtually indistinguishable from the error-free case.
These results show that RPR has the potential to supply enough precision in a reduced-precision solution to allow continuous operation through both transient and persistent errors, even in finelycontrolled satellites.
Conclusion
This research has shown that RPR is a viable fault tolerance approach for arithmetic operations. In order for RPR to be effective, the upper and lower bounds of the result must be generated in a manner depending on the operation being executed, paying particular attention to the signs of the operands. Also, the RPR voter must be constructed such that it conducts a numerical comparison of the MSB of the precise result with the bound results, as opposed to the bitwise comparison used in TMR.
Experimental results show that for the simplest operations, RPR is not always the most efficient fault tolerance approach. Essentially, the benefit of RPR increases with the complexity of the operation to which it is applied.
System performance simulations demonstrate that RPR provides very good recovery from errors caused by SEE in spacecraft systems. With a baseline precision n of 52 bits, even an approximate RPR result with only eight bits of precision drastically improved the transient and steady-state response of an attitude control system. This and other implementation considerations contribute to the design trade space of FPGA capacity and power, fault tolerance requirements and system performance metrics.
